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Abstract. A vision-based keystroke inference attack is a side-channel
attack in which an attacker uses an optical device to record users on their
mobile devices and infer their keystrokes. The threat space for these at-
tacks has been studied in the past, but we argue that the defining char-
acteristics for this threat space, namely the strength of the attacker, are
outdated. Previous works do not study adversaries with vision systems
that have been trained with deep neural networks because these models
require large amounts of training data and curating such a dataset is ex-
pensive. To address this, we create a large-scale synthetic dataset to sim-
ulate the attack scenario for a keystroke inference attack. We show that
first pre-training on synthetic data, followed by adopting transfer learn-
ing techniques on real-life data, increases the performance of our deep
learning models. This indicates that these models are able to learn rich,
meaningful representations from our synthetic data and that training on
the synthetic data can help overcome the issue of having small, real-life
datasets for vision-based key stroke inference attacks. For this work, we
focus on single keypress classification where the input is a frame of a key-
press and the output is a predicted key. We are able to get an accuracy of
95.6% after pre-training a CNN on our synthetic data and training on a
small set of real-life data in an adversarial domain adaptation framework.
Source Code for Simulator: https://github.com/jlim13/keystroke-
inference-attack-synthetic-dataset-generator-
Keywords: Side-channel attack, domain adaptation, synthetic data
1 Introduction
Mobile devices have become the main interface for many aspects of human life.
People use their phones to connect with friends, send work emails, manage per-
sonal finances, and capture photos. Not only does the amount of information we
channel through our devices increase as our dependence on our devices increases,
but so does the level of sensitivity. It is not uncommon for users to enter social
security numbers, credit card numbers, birth dates, addresses, or other private
information onto mobile devices. As a result, it remains important to study at-
tacks that threaten mobile privacy and security. It is only by carefully studying
the threat landscape can more robust defenses can be devised.
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Fig. 1. Left: Example of real-life capture scenarios for vision-based keystroke inference
attacks. Right: Warped images of the phone to a known template image to consolidate
for the various viewpoints.
In this paper, we analyze Vision-based keystroke inference attacks wherein an
attacker uses an optical device to record users on their mobile devices and extract
user input. In past work, researchers have explored the ability of adversaries to
extract information via direct surveillance or reflective surfaces [2, 1, 16, 24, 3],
eye gaze [5], finger motion [25], and device perturbations [21]. Unfortunately,
these works do not examine adversarial settings where the attacker applies deep
learning methods — that have revolutionized computer vision in recent years
— and they only consider limited capture scenarios. Consequently, a broad un-
derstanding of the threat space for vision-based keystroke inference attacks is
missing.
To understand the threat posed by deep learning models, we consider the
methods by which an attacker might train such a model for general and reli-
able use. One of the key factors for the overall success of deep learning is the
availability of large, annotated datasets such as ImageNet [9] and MS COCO
[13]. Given a large corpus of annotated real-world data (Fig. 1), it is reasonable
to assume that an attacker could train a powerful model to predict user input
from video data. However, collecting annotated data for vision-based keystroke
inference attacks is a prohibitively expensive and time-consuming endeavor. In-
deed, acquiring a large-enough real-world dataset with sufficient variability for
this task would pose a daunting task. That said, an alternative strategy may be
possible: leveraging a simulation engine that offers flexibility to generate a wide
array of synthetic, yet realistic, data.
In what follows, we reexamine the threat space for vision-based direct surveil-
lance attacks. Specifically, we examine ability of an adversary equipped with a
deep learning systems that feeds off training data created in a systematic way
that does not constrain the parameters of the attacker or capture scenario. To
do so, we provide a framework for creating a simulation engine that models the
capture pipeline of an attacker. Using this framework, we can model different
capture scenarios of direct surveillance by permuting the parameters of the sim-
ulator: distance, brightness, user’s skin tone, angle, capture device, user’s device,
screen contrast, and typing style. Armed with this framework, we can readily
explore the power of adversaries with deep learning capabilities because of the
abundance of data we can generate. While there are differences between the
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synthetic data and real-life data, notably the texture and finger kinematics, we
show that our simulator produces data which allows us deep learning models to
learn rich, meaningful representations that can be leveraged in the presence of
a small set of real-life training data.
Our specific contributions include:
– The first analysis of vision-based keystroke inference attacks with adversaries
employing deep learning algorithms and capturing with mobile devices.
– A systematic approach for evaluating inference attacks that can simulate
various scenarios by permuting the capture parameters.
2 Related Work
Vison-based Keystroke Inference Attacks: Some of the earliest works on
keystroke inference attacks focused on direct line of sight and reflective surfaces
(i.e., teapots, sunglasses, eyes) [1, 2, 16, 24, 26, 25] to infer sensitive data. Under
those threat models, an attacker trains a keypress classifier that accounts for
various viewing angles and distances by aligning the user’s mobile phone to a
template keyboard. The success of these attacks rests on the ability to recover
graphical pins, words, and full sentences by detecting the individual keypresses.
More recent work considers threat models where an attacker can not see the
screen directly. For example, Sun et al. [21] study an attacker who is able to infer
keystrokes on an iPad by only observing the back side of the tablet, focusing
on the perturbations of the iPad as the user presses a key. They use steerable
pyramid decomposition to detect and measure this motion of select areas of
interest — the Apple logo, for example — in order infer keystrokes. Shukla et al.
[20] infer keystrokes by exploiting the spatio-temporal dynamics of a user’s hand
while typing. No information about the user’s screen activity is required, yet it
is possible to infer phone, ATM, and door pins. Chen et al. [5] also create an
attack where the user’s device is not observed. They track a user’s eye gaze to
infer graphical pins, iOS pins, and English words. The major drawback of these
methods that do not look to exploit the user’s on-screen information and finger
activity is that attacks do not perform as well compared to the methods that do
focus on the user’s finger motion and on-screen activity. The adversary trades
rate-of-success for discreetness.
Synthetic-to-Real Domain Adaptation: Synthetic-to-real domain adapta-
tion addresses the dataset bias problem between the synthetic domain X s =
{xsi ,ysi } and real-life domain X t = {xti,yti} where xi ⊂ Rd is the feature rep-
resentation and yi is the label. x
s
i and x
t
i are sampled from two different dis-
tributions but share the same feature representation and label space. Computer
vision and machine learning algorithms that are trained with supervision require
a considerable amount of annotated data that well covers the diverse distribution
of application scenarios. Due to the high costs of curating such datasets, many
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researchers have worked on creating realistic, high-quality synthetic sources. Re-
searchers have developed simulation engines to aid in training algorithms for
optical flow [10], eye gaze estimation [23], and semantic segmentation [18, 8, 17].
Numerous other approaches [4, 15, 6, 19, 11] adopt adversarial training to learn
a function to produce features that are domain invariant or to transform the
pixels in the synthetic data to match distribution of the real data.
3 Overview
The general workflow of our model is highlighted in Fig. 2. This vision-based
keystroke inference attack framework seeks to apply deep learning to a real-world
domain in which the attacker has very few labeled datapoints. First, simulated
training data is generated to model the space of attacker parameters, including
different viewpoints and recording devices, as well as the victim’s texting behav-
ior, for example, finger kinematics. Note that training annotations come for free
with this simulation, as the content of the victim’s message is specified by the
operator of the simulation engine. During the generation of synthetic data, we
also collect and annotate a small set of real-life training data.
fs loss	 Transfer	
Learning
fs loss	
Rendering
Engine	
Synthetic	Data	Generation
Real	Life	Data	Collection
Synthetic	Training Transfer	Learning Real	Life	Evaluation
Fig. 2. Overview of our Approach. The blue indicates the flow of the synthetic data.
The green indicates the flow of the real-life data. The orange indicates where the
synthetic-to-real domain transfer learning happens.
After simulation, we train a model, fs, on just the synthetic data. The rep-
resentations learned from fs are useful in the transfer learning step. fs can be
fine-tuned with real-life data, if available. Also, fs can enforce task consistency
when performing pixel-wise domain adaptation techniques [11] or the features
learned while training the source classifier can be used in adversarial discrimi-
native approaches [22]. Finally, after performing the transfer learning step, the
model fs can be applied to a real-life test set.
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3.1 Synthetic Dataset Generation
We develop a simulation engine for keystroke inference attacks in which the
attacker has a direct line of sight to the user’s phone screen. The parameters
that govern our simulations are: the attacker’s capture device, user’s mobile
device, capture distance, screen brightness and contrast, the user’s skin tone,
and the typed message. Being able to permute these parameters allows us to
systematically assess the threat space for this attack because we are not restricted
to a fixed attack setting. The general pipeline is displayed in the “Synthetic Data
Generation” module of Fig. 2.
Capture Stage In the capture stage, the attacker uses an optical device such
as a mobile phone’s camera to record the user’s behavior. In our scenario, the
attacker focuses on recording the user’s device and the associated finger move-
ments that result from different keypresses. For our experiments, we set the
attacker’s capture device as the camera on the iPhone 6 and the user’s device as
an iPhone XR. For simulation, we utilize 3D models of the iPhone XR and the
user’s thumb. For a given keypress, we align the thumb model over the associ-
ated key and then render the thumb and iPhone models into a randomly selected
attacker viewpoint, thereby simulating what a real-world attacker would observe.
Information Extraction and Alignment This critical step allows us to con-
solidate all of the varying capturing positions of the attacker to one view. Given
an image of the user’s finger and phone (from the attacker’s point of view), we
need to extract meaningful information such as the type of phone or localization
of the finger. This can be done via computer vision algorithms, for example, run-
ning a phone detection algorithm localize the phone, or by manually cropping
out the phone in the image. Regardless of the approach, the goal of this step
is to extract the most salient information from the given image. In our case,
we assume that the attacker can manually crops out the phone the most salient
information is the phone and user’s fingers.
Next, we need to extract the four corners of the user’s device in order to align
the image of the phone to a reference template via a homography. A homography
is a a 2D projective transformation that relates two images of the same planar
object. The phone is a planar object that is captured from varying viewpoints.
The phone in the images that we capture are all related to each other by a
homography transformation. Given any image of the phone, we can warp that
image to a template image by the homography matrix, H. We can calculate H
using the four corners of the rendered image, which we know from simulation, and
the four corners of the template image. In our explorations, we use the iPhone
XR image from Apple Xcode’s simulator as our template image and use the
dimensions of the phone, which are available online, for the four corners. While
the captured phone and template phone are both planar objects, the thumb
is not. There is minimal distortion and our experiments show that this does
not affect the learning process. Once the captured image and template image
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are aligned, we can train a classifier to predict the keypress. The input to the
classifier is a single image of a single key press, and the output is a prediction of
which key was pressed.
Fig. 3. Left: Examples of our synthetic data. Right: Examples of our real-life data.
3.2 Single Keypress Classification
For single keypress classification, the input is a single image of the user’s thumb
over a specific key. As previously mentioned, the input image is homography-
aligned to the reference image to consolidate the different viewpoints from which
the attacker can capture the user. We train a model to output a predicted key,
p
′
on a QWERTY keyboard.
We train a Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN) for our evaluations, and show that the deep
learning approach performs better than the shallow methods. This is a 26-way
classification task that is trained by the cross entropy loss function:
L = E(x,y)∼X
N∑
n=1
1[n=y] log(σ(f(x))) (1)
Previous works have analyzed single keypress classification, but we differ in
that we only focus on attackers with mobile devices. Xu et al. [24] and Ragu-
ram et al. [16] use high-end recording devices in their setup, and while those
devices are considerably smaller and cheaper than telescopes used by Backes
et al. [1, 2] and Kuhn [12], the size and conspicuousness of such devices still
restricts their use in discreet capturing scenarios. While mobile cameras have
less capture capability than a high-end DSLR or telescope, they allow for more
discreet capturing, making the attack less noticeable.
Transfer Learning We adopt transfer learning techniques to bridge the gap
between the synthetic and real-life data distributions. Recall that the major-
ity of our data comes from a simulation engine and we do the majority of our
training on this data to compensate for the difficulty in collecting real-life data
samples. We adopt two approaches for transfer learning: fine-tuning and adver-
sarial domain adaptation, similar to the technique introduced by Tzeng et al.
[22].
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CNNs are successful in vision tasks in which we have large amounts of training
data because they are able to learn powerful representations with millions of
parameters. Due to the high number of parameters in these CNNs, we are unable
to learn meaningful representations on a small dataset. Oquab et al. [14] and
Chu et al. [7] have shown that CNNs initially trained on a large dataset can
transfer those representations to the target dataset by fine-tuning the CNN.
Fine-tuning allows us to learn the key features for the general task of single
key press classification using synthetic data and allows adjust the weights for a
specific domain of single key press classification. Our results show that a CNN
trained on our synthetic data learns a representation that can be transferred to
real life data.
We follow the Adversarial Discriminative Domain Adaptation, ADDA, frame-
work introduced by Tzeng et al. [22] where the purpose is to learn a domain in-
variant feature representation between the source and target domain. The source
domain is denoted as X s = {xsi ,ysi } where xsi is the feature representation and
ysi is the label. The target domain is denoted as X t = {xti,yti}. In the target
domain we have a small set of labeled instances. A visual classifier, f , can be
decomposed into two functions, f = g ◦ h. g is the feature extractor that takes
the input image into a d-dimensional feature space and h is the predictor that
takes the feature representation and outputs a probability distribution over the
label space. gs and gt represent the feature extractors for the source and target
domains, respectively. hs and ht represent the predictors.
The training for ADDA is done in multiple stages; we do make some slight
adjustments to the training process as we have access to a small set of labels
in the target domain. First, we train gs and hs to minimize the loss function
1. Next, we train gt in an adversarial fashion. We maximize the discriminator’s
ability to distinguish between the features outputted from gt and gs while also
forcing gt to extract features that are indistinguishable from those extracted
from gs. During this step, we also train ht. Finally, we test using gt and ht. The
optimization procedure is formally denoted below:
min
gs,hs
Lcls = E(xs,ys)∼Xs
N∑
n=1
1[n=ys] log(σ(hs(gs(xs)))) (2)
min
D
Ladv(Xs, Xt, gs, gt) = Exs∼Xs [log gs(xs)] + Ext∼Xt [log (1gt(xt))] (3)
min
gs,gt
Lg(Xs, Xt, D) = Ext∼Xt [log D(gt(xt))] (4)
min
gt,ht
Lcls = E(xt,yt)∼Xt
N∑
n=1
1[n=yt] log(σ(ht(gt(xt)))) (5)
2 is trained by itself in the first stage. 3 and 4 are trained together in the
next step, and when labels are available, 5 is also used.
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4 Experiments
Next, we share our implementation details and experimental setup for single
keypress classification. We also utilize our simulation engine to simulate different
types of defenses and evaluate their effectiveness.
4.1 Single Keypress Classification
Perhaps not surprisingly, we show that a deep learning based approach outper-
forms shallow machine learning methods for single keypress classification. The
input to these models is a single frame of a keypress and the output is a predic-
tion of the pressed key. Our synthetic data consists of 15,000 keypress images
and were labeled as one of the 26 letters in the alphabet. We randomized the
lighting, screen blur, screen contrast, camera angle, distance (1-7 meters), and
skin tone in order to simulate various capture conditions and to diversify our
dataset. Our real life training data consisted of 540 images of single key press
frames. The dataset is split to 390, 80, and 80 images for training, testing, and
validation, respectively. These images were captured at distances of up to 5 me-
ters and were taken in both indoor and outdoor settings. We show that our
accuracy on our real-life test set is similar to that of our synthetic data after
adopting transfer learning techniques. We also conduct experiments to see how
the minimum number of instances for each class affects transfer learning. The
full real-life dataset has 15 instances for each class.
Method Synthetic Real-Life
Logistic Regression 81.8% 78.3%
SVM 80.4% 75.1%
CNN 96.3% 76.2%
Table 1. Single Key Classification. The scores under the Synthetic column are trained
and evaluated on only synthetic data. Similarly, for the Real-Life column.
Real Only Finetuning ADDA
CNN 76.2% 93.08% 95.6%
Table 2. Single Key Classification on real-life data. We compare the performance of a
CNN on a real-life test set. No Adaptation means that the CNN has a random weight
initialization and is trained using the real-life training set only. Finetuning and ADDA
use the CNN trained on synthetic as the initialization.
Experimental Setup We use a linear regression and a SVM as our baseline
methods for this task. A 3-layer CNN is used for our deep learning model. Each
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layer follows a Conv2d-BatchNorm2d-ReLU-MaxPool structure. Each layer has
filters of size 5x5, stride 1, and padding 2. The channels are 16, 32, and 16 for
each layer. After these convolution layers, there is a linear layer, followed by
a 26-way softmax layer. We set our initial learning rate to 0.0002 and use the
Adam optimizer. We also crop out the image so that we are only focusing on the
keyboard and location of the finger.
For the finetuning experiments, we take the same CNN architecture trained
just on synthetic data, replace the last linear layer with a new one, and freeze
the early layers. We used a learning rate of 0.00002 using the Adam optimizer
and trained it for 60 epochs. For the ADDA results, we use a learning rates of
0.0002 and 0.0004 for the classifiers and feature extractors, respectively.
Results Table 1 shows that the CNN significantly outperforms the two shallow
methods when trained and evaluated synthetic data. However, if we train and
evaluate on just the real-life data, we see a decrease in performance because
the model is overfitting to the training data. Training and evaulating on such a
small dataset does not give us any insight into this attack because a dedicated
attacker could curate his own dataset large enough to benefit from deep learning
approaches. We adopt transfer learning approaches to compensate for our lack of
real-life training data. Finetuning gives us a classification score that approaches
the synthetic data performance, which indicates that our simulation engine is
capable of generating data to evaluate single key press classification when we
are constrained with limited real-life data. ADDA yields the highest results. In
4.1, we show our performance on the real-life test while decreasing the number
of per-class examples seen during training.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
80
85
90
95
100
Number of instances per class
A
cc
u
ra
cy
ADDA
Finetuning
Fig. 4. The accuracy on the real-life test set is plotted against the number of per-class
instances seen during training.
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4.2 Defenses
Establishing defenses that generalize against multiple attacks is a very challeng-
ing problem. One of the main challenges for establishing defenses for vision-based
keystroke inference attacks is that there are a few number of methods to pre-
vent an attacker from capturing a user’s behavior. The most effective method
is abstaining from mobile phone usage, but that is not a practical solution for
most people. Many of the previous suggest countermeasures to the attacks it
presented, but a defense for attack A can be the threat scenario for attack B.
For example, the defense against an attacker who exploits eye gaze would be to
wear dark, protective eyewear such as sunglasses, but the user is at risk against
an attacker who looks for compromising reflections. Some defenses that can gen-
eralize to multiple attacks is the user of randomized keyboards, typing fast, and
dynamically moving the phone while typing. While we are not able to study all
possible defenses, our simulation engine allows to study some subset of defenses
in a systematic way.
Fig. 5. Left: the standard QWERTY key-
board. Next to it is a randomly permuted
keyboard. For our experiments, note that
we only permute the 26 letters. Right: dif-
ferent on-screen perturbations. The top
phone screens are corrupted with Gaus-
sian noise with σs of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.75,
respectively. The bottoms have on-screen
blocks of varying colors and sizes
On-Screen Perturbation Accuracy
Gaussian (σ = 0.001) 94.3%
Gaussian (σ = 0.05) 94.3%
Gaussian (σ = 0.15) 94.3%
Gaussian (σ = 0.75) 92%
Small Corruption 82.1%
Large Corruption 45.4%
Thumb Corruption 84.8%
Table 3. Evaluating On-Screen
Perturbations as Defenses. We eval-
uate how a CNN trained without
ever seeing any of these perturba-
tions performs against them.
Experimental Setup We simulate a few possible on-screen perturbations as
defenses for single key press classification. These perturbations can be emitted
from the mobile phone’s screen. We simulate different Gaussian noise patterns
and different ”phone screen corruptions” as types of on-screen perturbations.
Small and Large Corruptions are those in which we have the phone randomly
emit various shapes across the phone screen. A Thumb Corruption is when the
phone emits a random shape around the user’s thumb when he presses a key.
We also study how our methods perform against randomized keyboards.
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Randomized keyboards are one of the most effective ways to defend against
keystroke inference attacks. Vision-based keystroke inference attacks learn a
mapping between user behavior to a fixed keyboard layout. This mapping is
broken when the keyboard layout changes. We generate a dataset of randomized
keyboards and evaluate how a CNN trained on layout A performs on layout B.
Results To evaluate the different on-screen perturbations, we first train a CNN
on synthetic data without any of these perturbations. Then, we evaluate the
model on a separate test set with these corruptions. The results are displayed
in 5. The defense becomes more effective as the severity of the perturbations
increase. Of course, doing so takes away from the user’s usability. While some
of the on-screen perturbations were effective in spoofing the CNN, if we were
to train the CNN with these perturbations in the training set, the defenses do
not hold. The CNN is unaffected as these perturbations become a form of data
augmentation.
Randomized keyboards are an effective defense against the model used in
our experiments. We first train a CNN on synthetic data on a QWERTY layout.
Then, we generate a training set with a fixed layout, B, that is not a QWERTY.
If we evaluate the CNN trained on the QWERTY, we do not get better than
0.04% accuracy, which means that the classifier is guessing. Similarly, if we gen-
erate a new training and testing set, all with instances of randomly permuted
keyboards, we still do not do better than guessing. This indicates that the model
can not recover any sort of information from the keyboard to indicate which key
is pressed. The model effectively learns a mapping from the user’s finger tip to an
assumed keyboard layout. If that assumption is broken, then the model can not
predict the key. Of course, the biggest sacrifice for using a randomized keyboard
is the severe decrease in usability.
5 Conclusion
We explored a method to evaluate deep learning methods for vision based
keystroke inference attacks; a domain in which curating a dataset large and
diverse enough for deep learning methods is expensive. In doing so, we devel-
oped a simulation engine that generates data that allows us to systematically
study these attacks by manipulating various parameters (e.g., capture distance,
camera rotation, screen brightness, texting speed). Similarly, this capability al-
lows us to study different defenses. We create synthetic data for the task of single
key press classification, and show that deep learning models, when pre-trained
on this data, are able to learn powerful representations that compensate for the
lack of real-life training data. Our experiments not only show that deep learning
approach outperforms shallow methods for single key press classification, but
also show that an attacker does not need many real-life data points to train such
a classifier. These experiments indicate that we need to rethink our beliefs of the
threat space for vision-based keystroke inference attacks, as they are outdated.
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